Consistent with the foregoing, the Board suspended the individual from the same September 11, 1973. In support of this measure, argued that there a picture of internal disturbance attributed to the existence of rebels or seditious, was declared a state of siege throughout the national territory and the state of emergency in certain provinces and departments. As noted
Decree Law No. 5, published in the Official Gazette on September 22, 1973, the "state of siege decreed by internal disturbance in the circumstances facing the country", should be considered a "'state or time of war '"subject to the rules that the Code of Military Justice and other criminal laws contemplated for such critical situations. This mandatory did nothing to remove from the hands of the ordinary courts for the benefit of military justice in time of war the "knowledge and deciding cases for violations of rules on state
site." States of emergency would be renewed without interruption
for fifteen years in a row, while the state of siege-category to further expand the discretionary power in their task of repression, granting government officials the power to order arbitrary arrests, press censorship and suspending a host of civil liberties, would last until March 1978 and then reinstated twice, both in the 1980s.
is legitimate to ask whether there was in fact the "internal war"
repeatedly alleged by the new authorities and their followers as a justification for its repressive policies. Today there is agreement that the armed forces and police gained control of the country during the day of the coup, without suffering major setbacks anywhere. This is explained by the lack of divisions between the Armed Forces, acting jointly, without experiencing breaks between sectors involved in the overthrow of Salvador Allende and others committed to their defense. Some senior party officials of the respect for constitutional order and the policy regardless of the armed forces and police had been forced to resign in the weeks before the Sept. 11, after being isolated within their own institutions, and weighted in favor of institutional extra output to the political crisis of 1973. Additionally, cases consist of all ranks military victims of political repression perpetrated by their peers.
Among the supporters of the deposed government dominated the confusion and fear.
The little resistance that there was sporadic, isolated, uncoordinated, and ineffective fire capability against a professional army cohesive and, moreover, at war. Armed Forces in raids prior to the coup carried out under the recent gun control law had been aware of the lack of relevant or significant stockpiles held by sectors involved in the Unidad Popular, while evaluating the repressive provisions of the NCOs and troops, testing especially in raids firms controlled by workers.
In any case, according to the confession of officers to implement the military coup, caused surprise found little or no resistance, even in major cities.
recorded testimony by Admiral Sergio Huidobro in his memoirs, naval Decision (1998), clear doubts about the almost immediate control of the country by Forces Armed and Order. To assess in perspective the documentary value of his words, it should be noted that, at the time of the coup, Huidobro was part of the High Command of the Navy.
When the military operation began to act, Concepcion was controlled without firing a shot and the same Talcahuano. Same thing happened to the mining centers in Lota, Coronel and Chuquicamata. There were only isolated outbreaks of resistance in some cities. In most parts of the country, their homes and feathering population was enhanced quickly to normal.
In Santiago, the city control was achieved in a few hours. There were only isolated skirmishes in some campuses and factories nationalized and peripheral populations. Only in the center of Santiago is offered in a close fight fire with snipers on the most prominent buildings such as Torre Entel, which was shot with artillery, the new building of the newspaper "Clarín" and others.
telephone services, water, electricity, gas, operated normally through control of the armed forces applied from the dawn of day 11.
General Augusto Pinochet himself, newly appointed commander of the Army, in the edition of September 18, 1973 the newspaper El Mercurio, said: "The calculations we had about five days of fighting, were reduced to 24 hours instead. It was a surprise for us. "
can not be ignored that the most radical of the right and left boasted since the Sixties, a warlike rhetoric that favored the validation of the use of violence. Major media helped fuel political conflicts, using language and libelous disqualifying discouraging dialogue and agreement between the parties in conflict.
With regard to the left, there were proponents emphasize internal tensions to reach the climax of a final showdown . It was hoped that it would solve, by use of arms, the escalating conflict between the revolutionary forces and sectors identified with the defense of capitalism or against radical and abrupt change from the traditional economic structures. To be sure, these theoretical purposes, which caused alarm among the military and police, never resulted in the formation of armed groups able to form a "popular army" parallel, in terms of trying to finally take political power.
This applies both to the organized vanguard of the People (VOP) as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), two groups that made up the Popular Unity coalition. The VOP, as make the right-wing group Patria y Libertad, resorted to selective political assassination, but never became a very small circle of activists. As for the MIR, since the late sixties began armed actions more visible by news that its impact effective drag between the real population and its military power. For their part, the weapons held by authorities and supporters of Popular Unity, at least the authorities seized by the military regime, which stressed the military strength of the "enemy within" - in no case amounted to equip a group conditions threatening a professional army. However it was
abound the testimonies of prisoners who, from his own apprehension and then during the course of the tortures inflicted by their captors, they were constantly pressed to reveal the alleged cache of weapons. In the case of the military, this assumption was inscribed, according to accounts of people who came to this Commission, as part of the struggle against international communism and the Cold War. To this was added the obvious influence of the Cuban revolution in some sectors of the Left, which has inspired, armed proposed road to socialism.
revolutionary rhetoric of these groups gave credibility to the fears of many Chileans, despite the absence of a movement rural or urban guerrilla in the country, at the time of the coup d'etat.
therefore be difficult to find grounds for the thesis of "civil war", which has appealed strongly when trying to explain and validate, both at the same time and in retrospect, political repression practiced Armed Forces and Police. The National Security Doctrine, central to military ideology adapted to the polarized world of the Cold War, proposed the existence of an internal enemy that sought to subvert the order by any means possible, and the Armed Forces as immune to special interests that national unity cracking social and ideological disagreements.
In defense of that organic unity proper to apply the counterinsurgency methods instilled by military training schools in the United States by generations of American and Chilean officials, whose matching methods pointed to the existence of a common model. According to this ideology, repression was a legitimate response to overt or hidden subversion and was relieved to respect the human rights of people who are subtracted motu proprio of ownership, to join the ranks of the enemy. It was none other than Marxism, broadly understood, so far as to cover at least the next few months in a military coup, anyone suspected to resist the dictatorship, especially by its commitment to the political project of the Unidad Popular. But the brutal repression also found among the police officers determined to remote locations and among conscripts, work only superficially exposed to indoctrination. Some obeyed orders
knowing disregard costs, while others were pleased with the new task. In the barracks were encouraged hostility towards civilians by recruits programmatically hostility intensified over the "communist" virtual enemy of military exercises and combat practices.
In fact, government work, in the words of General Gustavo Leigh,
Commander in Chief of the Air Force and, as such, a member of the military junta, was to extirpate the Marxist cancer that threatened the organic life of the nation, using extreme measures, "until the last consequences" .1 Proclamation No. 30 of September 17, 1973, responsibility of the head of Area Cautín, proves that this spirit of annihilation against the alleged enemy within represented an official policy of the military regime, implemented regardless of
standards in wartime at least according to international treaties signed by previous governments of Chile:
In exercise of the powers vested in me, order: 1. From tomorrow, Tuesday, September 18, 1973, the curfew hours will last from 19.00 hours until 06.00 hours the following day. 2. Population are cautioned that any manifestation of opposition to the action of the armed forces or police, either during a raid or while carrying out work monitoring and control of public policy, in word or deed, should be discarded immediately with the use of service weapons. 3. Any action
resistance from extremist groups, forcing the military to take more drastic penalties, not only for perpetrators but also against those detained under house arrest or surveillance. 4. Armed Forces and the police will be aggressive in maintaining public order in either the comfort of all Chileans.
For every innocent who falls will be executed 10 items Marxist undesirable delay, and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Military Justice in Time of War.
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