¨ * ° ° Buenos Aires Green "¨ * ¨ Decriminalizes Comment

Annexes: Annex 1

: Order of Battle
Annex 2: Jurisdictions
Annex 3: Intelligence
Annex 5: Social Communication
Annex 6: Legal Basis
Annex 7: Personal
Annex 8: Annex 9
Logistics:
Civil Affairs Annex 10: Finance.
Annex 11: Security for the implementation of various activities.
Annex 12: Other missions and functions of the FFSS, PF and the Prison Service.
Annex 13: Security for the development of sports activities in the jurisdiction
Z 1 Appendix 14: Communications and electronics.
Annex 15: Reports

Distributor:

Copy 1 and 2 ................................ Gral Cdo Ej (General Command of the Army)
Copy 3 ...................................... Cte Z 1 (Army I Corps Commander)
Copy 4 ...................................... Cte Z 2 (for knowledge) (Army Commander II)
Copy 5 ................................. ..... Cte Z 3 (for knowledge) (Army Commander III)
Copy 6 ................................. ..... Cte Z 4 (for knowledge) (Commander Military Institute) Copy
.................................. 7 .... Cte Z 5 (for knowledge) (V Corps Commander)
Copy 8 ................................. ..... 2nd. Ct. JEM and Cdo. Cpo. Eg I and Cte. SZ CF (Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Army I Corps and Commander of the Federal Capital Subzone)
Copy 9 ........................ .............. Department I - Pers Cdo. Cpo. Ie I (Department I Corps Command Staff I)
copy .................................. 10 .. Dept II. Dept II-ICIA. Cdo. Cpo. Ie I (Department II Army Corps Intelligence Command I)
Copy 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 ............ Dept III - Op Cdo. Cpo. Ie I (Department III Corps Command Operations I)
copy .................................. 16 .. Department IV - Log. Cdo. Cpo. Ie I (Department IV Corps Logistics Command I)
copy .................................. 17 .. Div Com. Cdo. Cpo. Ie I (Division Army Communications Command I) ................................... 18
Copy . Subz. 11 (Subarea 11 - Infantry Brigade Commander X) Copy
.................................... 19 Subz. 12 (Subarea 12 - Armored Cavalry Brigade Commander I) ................................... 20
Copy . Subz. 13 - Cte A 101 (Artillery Command 101) .................................... 21
Copy Subz. 14 - J Dest. Expl. C Bl 101 (Subarea 14 Leader of Task Force Armored Cavalry Exploration 101) ............................... 22
Copy ..... Subz. 15 - J Agr ADA 601 (Group Head of Air Defense Artillery 601) .............................. 23
Copy ...... Subz. 16 - Cdr. Ae Br VII (VII Air Brigade Commander)
Copy .................................... 24 B. Com. Cdo. 101 (Command Communications Battalion 101) .................................... 25
Copy Dest. ICIA. 101 (Intelligence Detachment 101) .................................... 26
Copy Gen Dir Nac (For the) (National Gendarmerie) Copy
.................................. 27 .. Dest. Mov. 1 (GN) (Detachment National Gendarmerie Mobile 1) Copy
.................................... 28 Cdo. ARA General (Commanding General of the Navy) .................................... 29
Copy Cdo. FAA General (Air Force General Command) Copy
.................................... 30 PFA (Federal Police Argentina)
Copy .................................... 31 BSAS Pol Province (Police of the Province of Buenos Aires) ............................... 32
Copy ..... B. ICIA. 601 (Intelligence Battalion 601)
Copy 33, 34, 35, 36 ..................

file (...) (d) Each Cdo. Subz. shall make known to all elements that somehow they have any relationship of dependency, the content and / or spirit of this Order of Operations.

is a copy:
SAN VICENTE MANUEL ROMAN

Colonel J. Department III - Op - Cpd. Z 1

Pag 21-21

In the nineteenth day of April of the year 1977, between the Commander of Zone 1, Major General D. Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason and Mr Zone 4 Commander, Major General D. Santiago Omar Riveros, is built to this record of establishing the rules that will meet the licensing requirements to run covert operations by elements of an area of \u200b\u200ba neighboring jurisdiction. These provisions will come into effect from May 021 200. 77.

I.

OVERVIEW 1. It's primary purpose of this Act-Agreement, the arbitrating means to nullify or significantly reduce the looting, theft., against private property, while enabling maximum control of covert operations. (...)

II. REQUIREMENTS Z 4 AZ 1 (Example)

1. Z 4 calls "free area" to Z 1. We clarified the following points:

- Objective (given a point, the open area covers a circumference of three blocks of radio)
- Time it will operate.
- Vehicles (quantity, brand, type, plates, color)
- People (number and gender)
- signal recognition

2. Z 1 communicates to the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) of the subarea to which corresponds the coordinated requirements and once awarded the "free area" to Z 4. (...)

Santiago Omar Riveros SUAREZ MASON CARLOS GUILLERMO
Major General Major General
Cte. Z 4 Ct. Z 1 BUENOS AIRES

131200Jun77
ORT-99

1. PURPOSE

Establish standards and procedures to be taken by subareas, Federal Penitentiary Service (PENDEFER) and Correctional Service of the Province of Buenos Aires (SERCOBE)

2. LEGAL BASIS

Current effective.

3. SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER

a) subversive acts

1) Crimes CGEE competence (Council of the Special Military Tribunal)

fall into this situation or incur detainees allegedly fall under the commission of crimes envisaged in and prohibited by the laws promulgated by the military junta or those who promulgate the national government, which competition resulting from these military tribunals.

2) Not included in 1)
Every prisoner on account of operations derived from the implementation of this order shall be:
a) Since by executive order, under Decree 17/75 Issue 27 (State of Siege).
b) Simultaneously, we begin the process, if there's evidence of subversive implication, with Federal Judge competent participation. B.

Concomitant with subversive acts are covered
those who should be detained on the grounds that, with their activity, affecting the safety and / or public peace, without being able to qualify strictly as subversive criminals. Pag

1-9

c.
SECRET Other

remain covered within this standard detainees who, as a result of military operations, investigations or other proceedings, become common criminals.
These will be made available to the competent ordinary courts, through the appropriate law enforcement authorities.

d. Military personnel.

If any of the foregoing cited cases involving military personnel, the procedure taking into account:

1) In

activity shall be made statutory procedures established by the Code of Military Justice and its regulation.

2) retired in

the procedure will be adopted in each case, as appropriate.

Author's note:
respect of military personnel accused of having links with subversion and procedures "adopted" for each case is imperative to remember:

1. The soldiers one hundred twenty-nine conscripts who disappeared during the state terrorism that were not tried. All those guys, declared deserters, along with their superiors, up the book "The Lost Squadron."

2. The dead and Colonel (R) Luis César Perlinger was at the end of your vacation in the Copahue Spa, on March 24, 1976, accompanied by his wife Marta. They could not know that the medical director of the spas, doctor Ricardo Achenbach, had orders to arrest Perlinger, who was an old friend. To avoid the annoyance of such a thankless task decomposed military radio, the only means of communication to the outside. For that reason Perlinger and Marta said goodbye ACHEMBACH as if nothing happened, the March 24, 1976. At

Zapala in the car were detained by military personnel in a position of "control of routes." And yes there detained him, without telling Martin what would be the place of detention.

Marta, alone, he continued to Bariloche, where he had his home and asked to be received by the lieutenant colonel in charge of the Mountain Military School, unable to be served. (The director, Colonel Néstor Rubén CASTELLI, was in Viedma and military Controller Black River Province, the deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rito Burgoa served as mayor of Bariloche). Marta

traveled to Buenos Aires and interviewed Monsignor ARAMBURU known Perlinger marriage from the time he was head of the military regiment in Tucumán, and the religious, the bishop of that diocese. The only thing ARAMBURU Marta was asked that "Fred will not be killed."

Marta returned to Bariloche Perlinger unaware that he was detained in Neuquen, and March 30 at the four or five o'clock a military patrol commanded by Lieutenant Ricardo Beltran Ballestrino raided and destroyed his home, ostensibly to find go to knowing why. When no prisoners, hooded gang took two sons of Perlinger and two friends who slept there.

Marta morning, went to the quartermaster of Bariloche and asked to speak with Lieutenant Colonel Burgoa, who recently attended her at three in the afternoon. Surely the lieutenant colonel was quick to seek instructions on how to proceed before a woman angry at her husband and two children were kidnapped and his home destroyed by soldiers, comrades of her husband.

Burgoa, very friendly, he said at last Perlinger was in Neuquén and the children and their friends very well in the Mountain Military School. The truth was that the four boys spent ten days on the golf hooded palette garrison Bariloche, a clandestine detention center known little so far. The four youths were released without charge or explanation.

Colonel Neuquén Perlinger wrote from a note to General Roberto Eduardo Viola, Chief of Staff, to express their outrage at the attacks against him and his family, the more concepts. The text of the note was deemed "offensive" by Viola and ordered an investigation. The investigating judge was a general who took two years to complete its task. After all the Council of War, Perlinger, was acquitted of inconsistent positions, and made available to the military junta in the prison of Magdalena, which already had one and a half, on 24 May 1979. Meanwhile

Marta asked to make use the option to leave the country, an option accepted by Spain, France, Germany and Venezuela, on and as Interior Minister, General Albano Harguindeguy, rejected them one by one.

Thus came the March 19, 1982, when they returned home Perlinger arrested and police guard at the door. Complete freedom came the September 30, 1983, when the state terrorists rushing the shameful retreat into the sewer of history.

3. On 18 March 1977, the former federal prosecutor Antonio Bautista BETTINI traveling in his car accompanied by his son, Lt. Jorge Devoto frigate. Iban a meeting with police chiefs in the province Buenos Aires, supposed to receive information about the disappearance of Marcelo BETTINI, son of former prosecutor, took place on December 9, 1976 as he headed to the University of La Plata.

Within walking distance of the Investigations Brigade were intercepted by a group of armed men. A hooded and held BETTINI devotee and let him flee. The former prosecutor has been missing since that day and the frigate lieutenant devotee since 21 March, after Liberty into the building to try to find answers to the disappearance of his father and his brother.

4. On March 24, 1976 at two o'clock military and federal police stormed in the department of Lieutenant Colonel (R) Bernardo Alberto.

The soldier was shot into space from the sixth floor, while the mangled body lay on the pavement, the mob turned to plunder the dwelling and possession of documents classified by the family as "very valuable."

Bernardo Alberto had been delegated PERON staff and secretary general of the National Movement Justicialista in 1967. On March 24, 1976, hours before the military sent a note to Lieutenant General Videla is reproduced below in paragraphs more significant.

"To Mr. Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla D., Commanding General of the Army. SD.

"I am writing to report the following effects:

1. The day 20-III-76 to 20 hours, an armed group attempted to kidnap me in my offices Rivadavia Street 764 1 °, with the apparent purpose to kill me. just retired from the place chosen by the armed group a few minutes earlier, which allowed me to observe the operation from the street, and the large deployment of assets and personnel used.

2. The personal observation of the facts I can assure you that they were security forces, who after arresting three people who were in those offices, handcuffed, blindfolded and load them into vehicles, moved quickly Rivadavia down the street to the West, unable to follow due to lack of private vehicle at the time. The shift came with the usual touch of siren of the police vehicles.

3. The day before in an operation connected with the already described was kidnapped and then murdered, the young Peronist Augusto ALTIERI Max.

4. In those offices policy development activities related to the Peronist movement, part of the current Peronist "July 26" whose ideology comes from the documentation attached.

5. This formal, written complaint presented it at this time after having exhausted all means to find out the whereabouts of the young ALTIERI, I got, but died on Saturday 20, after unsuccessful efforts made at the General Command, in the Ministry of Interior, and through personal connections with comrades related information services.

6. The personal search conducted with his father was facilitated by fellow Peronist the Municipality of Avellaneda and police personnel from the 1st Precinct of the city, which allowed me to find it riddled with bullets in the Avellaneda cemetery morgue, unidentified, in advanced state of decomposition, with the open belly and the guts to air. The body was a simple NN, four days after being found by the police of Tristan Smith, in his jurisdiction, having failed in his usual effective method of identification without cause.

7. It is very likely that if there was no means of finding the decision and described the cooperation of staff had no opportunity for their families to exercise the right of Christian burial

(...) undoubtedly moving towards a confrontation towards which We want to gradually bring false choices and false values \u200b\u200bdriving and observing the light and alarm to the irresponsibility of certain people and sectors that have power, power transition, encourage the confrontation with facts or words.

And pointing to this concept to our comrades in the armed forces, anxious to hear their eulogies, for example, when before their deaths seem to want to overcome with words should take positions with silent and positive events. I have also the experience of eulogies. I speak in tribute to our workers and soldiers killed and also to comrades shot by other comrades and I understand now that not enough words or speeches, or prayers for the dead, and the homilies of our holy pastors of the Church to hide the causes that generate violence that is between us for a long time.

recognize that using a dead his death, to vent his "anger" about the injustice of the death, is entitled to do, but if we followed that struggle to exalt our dead, I ask: Who has more right? One who had the opportunity to assist and, at least, still warm and bleeding touch, or see just "groomed" by the funeral home, prepared for the tribute and to go "clean" to glory. Or one who has to pick up a dirty ditch or a pasture, shot wildly, helpless and bound, tortured and blindfolded their eyes, a high degree of decomposition, as they say the autopsy, or as we say, rotten and ready to be and eaten by worms
(...)
This is the fate of many of our members and our workers. Can a colonel or a general to take some time, with a speech, a tragedy like this? Saving you the answer does not. I no longer do more. No Words are not enough to avoid

(...) What happens to us when we accept the Argentine dead to classify the "desirable" or "undesirable" when we get used and to tolerate and we promote the excesses of power, when you give up the debate and agree that the holders of that power may be considered in any case its excesses can legally framed figures as "excess defense" or other inventions, when the mouth of general refuse Nation democracy, arguing that it could lead to a "government atheist, materialist, totalitarian?

(...) We do not consider the armed forces as an institution possessed of immutable values, but as a human institution acts for good or ill, according to the men who run them circumstantially. They are not better or worse than the men who compose it, and therefore there is no historical continuity that rivals the military over time with the same seal of excellence, selflessness and patriotism, nor the merit of a time reaching the stars of another, unless the revalidate their own behavior. And the same with respect a conductas infamantes. Los méritos de San Martín no apañan a QUARANTA, ni FERNANDEZ SUAREZ infama a BELGRANO o DORREGO o a GUEMES. Podemos admirar al Almte. BROWN y negar al mismo tiempo a ROJAS y a BENIGNO VARELA. Podemos sentirnos deudores y herederos de tantos milicos que regaron con su sangre el suelo de América y de la Patria y no por ello atenuar nuestro juicio sobre los oficiales cómplices, ejecutores y consentidores de vejámenes y torturas" (...)

Es que los argentinos tenemos una ingrata experiencia acumulada en este siglo. Cuando con el argumento siempre esgrimido y ahora repetido, de la necesidad de defender "un estilo de vida", nuestro estilo de vida, el Ejército protagonizó como represor la historia de the "Tragic Patagonia" and the workers did like martyrs when from naval aircraft with crew politicians also bombarded the town in the Plaza de Mayo, when he shot at the National Penitentiary in José León Suárez and Campo de Mayo, where were shot in Trelew, when soldiers took part in the desecration of the corpse of Evita, where the Army in a major operation intended to prevent the reunion of the people with their leader, when representatives of the three weapons attend calls for the most representative of business " leaders "and most rancid of landowners and farmers, to consider the national economic situation and criticize the government without taking on their own, etc., worry takes hold of the popular sectors, especially when it is announced that the Army take action against subversion in the factories, work of our workers and not say anything about it in companies, instead of plundering the country and the national heritage.

The situation is serious and dramatic, not only for workers but also for their own armed forces, driven to advance in a field, wherein the inclined plane will be taken to replace the police of manufacturing environments, yet private, and being custodians of the interests of one party, precisely the least likely to represent the public interest.

(...) If we add that armed gangs move the capital of the Republic and the settlements, without any response from the forces of order and without the authorities (in this case the chief Federal Police) to their knowledge, the problem is more serious, because they assume that the general head of that police would not stop, but he can not, the facts and get over things.

If further investigations into the whereabouts of the young ALTIERI and others made, we find that its case is not unique to renew their daily morgue morgues and bodies riddled security not surprised in any way, but accept it as common and normal, we understand that pessimism about the real and serious responsibility and mission of law enforcement has seized them in the best case, as there are others in which they can assume complicit in these killings.

If we hear tell that the young police officers ALTIERI has been "executed", check what level reaches respect for the concept of justice, in whose service they should be.

All these events have occurred in the field with the High Command that has been linked, for the role he has assumed and that is why I put it to their attention.

Only and as a corollary of all this, it is one last thought. Faced with the already established concept of the inability of the armed forces for the exercise of political power, experienced three times so far this century, began to spread in public opinion and the same concept, but in roles that seem more specific these forces: the maintenance of order and security of the people it serves and officers have been active. (...)"

The economic progress of the plan left in ruins for small and medium enterprises. Unemployment grew in abductions, disappearances and illegal detention of persons. The foreign debt of 8000 million dollars came to 14,000 in late 1978. Expensive credit and lack of employment, aggravated the economic situation and operations orders extended the range of potential opponents as armed guerrillas disappeared.

In 1978 Argentina won the World Cup with victory over Holland in the River Plate stadium. Nearby, the arrest and torture in the ESMA, will heard the roar of the crowd excited, to which the three were responsible for his captivity. The same people who, excited by the sports national fervor, brought the country to a near war with Chile to cover with a nationwide outbreak of crime and social crisis.

Four years later, another World Cup, aggravated the economic situation and with 43,000 million dollars of foreign debt, Argentina we found the 2nd of April 1982 had been the military recovery of the Falkland Islands.

The triumvirate decided to "take to negotiate" and his ambition encouraged by the enthusiasm of a people deceived led to "take to combat." Made their decision resting on two assumptions were:

- The U.S. will remain hands off.
- Britain did not react war.

Malvinas After the battle with the annihilation of the Argentine troops (no killing of prisoners) and military junta moved the third, fourth and last ordered an investigation to establish responsibility for the defeat. On December 2, 1982 was created by decision of the Board "Review Commission of the South Atlantic Conflict." Members were: Lt. Gen. (R) Benjamin Rattenbach, Major General (R) Armando Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, Admiral (R) Alberto Pedro Vago, Vice Admiral (R) Jorge Alberto Boffi, Brigadier General (R) Carlos Alberto Rey, and brigade-major (R) Francisco Cabrera.

On September 16, 1983 the Commission completed its task and handed over to the military junta the 291 pages of the body of the report along with dozens of attachments. REPORT DUE

presents some sections of this Report Rattenbach "of importance to this work.

"874 East (Malvinas) was the only war the nation so far this century"
"274. (...) Ultimately, the decision (to take), which remained dormant, was influenced by particular political issues, such For example, the desirability of producing a significant event that would revitalize the National Reorganization Process
(...)" "783, First, it should be noted that the general state of the country, at the time of taking the decision to take Falkland Islands, was not best suited to deal with international political fact of such nature. "
" 784. Were concurrent causes it, the following: a.
The prevailing socio-economic crisis, with a country prostrated by pressing problems in that order.
(...)" "785. If the external situation is favorable to the national goal of regaining the southern archipelagos, the opportunity for have been successful. But it was not because: a.
National authorities were harshly attacked by the human rights issue, which significantly weakened the external front. "
b. Argentina Republic was sanctioned by the U.S. with embargoes on arms imports, which limited their leeway to properly equip and modernize its military equipment "
(...)
" Conclusion
788. The opportunity to freely set by the military junta to the recovery of the South Atlantic islands, mainly benefited the enemy. "

The human cost of military adventure organized by the Third Military Junta was 641 dead and 1208 more wounded and maimed and hundreds of suicides by veterans.

The "Report Rattenbach" requested the death penalty for the three members of the military junta, to award them the same responsibility as a collegial body.

During 1983 the Board issued its fourth law of "amnesty" and in November of that year had been burned all the documentary material referred to the fight against subversion. Rattenbach The report was never published by the State, although the December 4, 1987 was delivered to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a copy of the original photocopied.

From October 1975 the Army took primary responsibility in the "fight against subversion" under the provisions of Directive No. 1 / 75 of the Defence Council.

On October 28, 1975 twenty-four copies were distributed in the COUNCIL GENERAL OF THE ARMY COMMANDER, No. 404/75 (Anti-subversion). A year earlier, on November 6, 1974, was introduced by decree a state of siege and were arrested many people with and without specific charges. This decree was repealed only in Diciemnre of 1983, when the democratic government.

The "Army Mission" was imposed in section 4 of Directive 404/75, that said,

"offensive operations against subversion in the area of \u200b\u200btheir jurisdiction and beyond in support of the other armed forces to detect and destroy subversive organizations ...
a. primary responsibility will address counter-insurgency operations across the country level.
b. lead, with primary responsibility, effort, intelligence community (...) subversion information
c. Establish the VF (border surveillance) needed to to achieve isolation of the subversion of external support. "

The "Army Mission" would materialize through country's territorial division into zones, "sub" and "areas", according to the following schedule:

military Newsletters

The enigma of general, Hernán López Echagüe

CONADEP Report and its Annex.

Point 30. Report Desaparecedores. Federico Mittelbach.

Insecurity and denationalization. Salvador María Lozada, Julio J. Viaggio, Carlos Zamorano and Luis Eduardo Duhalde.

History and Present of the death penalty. Alfredo Bravo.

Torture, torture and other violence. Ricardo Rodríguez Molas.

The Lost Squadron. José Luis D'Andrea Mohr.

we said yesterday. Martín Eduardo Blaustein and Zubieta. Stock

"El Periodista de Buenos Aires." Editorial "The Magpie". Documents

Santa Fe I and II.

Magazine "Southern Cross". Del CEMIDA.

The Daily Reckoning. Profile Publishing.

The "Report Rattenbach"

Argentina and human rights. Argentina Patriotic Association. Neither

skinny forgiveness. Juan Gelman and Mara La Madrid. History

groups and political parties. R. Caesar García.

Journals Clarin, La Nacion, La Opinion, page 12. Document

Puebla.

The Drama of military autonomy. Alianza Editorial 1995. Prudencio Garcia

PLAN CONDOR - CHILE

National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture

Consciously or unconsciously, a conspiracy of silence on torture was slowly spreading across the country. Over the years many believed that although the abuse had been common on the prisoners of the military regime torture as such had not been so massive. However, those who had been tortured, most of the time, also in the memory kept silence, trademarks and consequences of "cruel, inhuman and degrading", according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which literally had life changed or maimed.

Others felt it was right and necessary to seek truth and justice in the cases of the disappeared and victims of political executions in summary trials and incomplete ... or so-called "representative cases" of human rights violations, but it was not possible to do justice for the victims of political imprisonment and torture. How could conclusively prove torture thirty years later? Or, What would be introduced into these issues when the last of these events seem so distant?

confess that some of these questions came up in the first session of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, established by the President of the Republic, Mr. Ricardo Lagos Escobar, after significant proposal on Human Rights "No tomorrow without yesterday ", 12 August 2003. What sense does it make a report thirty years later?

Today, after months of listening to stories intimate whispered, reported pain and even tears, and seeing the physical marks and psychological injuries as well as family and social, some beyond repair that restores the lost-for both Chileans imprisoned and tortured, no doubt assist us that this part of the truth also was due to complete us, the best way possible, reparation and justice that the country owes to these people, to advance along the path is always difficult and necessary for reunion and reconciliation between
Chileans.

More than thirty thousand people have marched in front of us, we have seen and heard. More than thirty thousand people have dared to approach our offices or respond to our calls in the regions. And more than thirty thousand times we heard the wonder, fear, powerlessness that still generates the dignity violated by government agents who are expected, or should be expected, respect for people, protecting the weak and strict compliance law.
Thus we have found, personally, that the corruption of power is the worst of corruptions, it ends by undermining the foundations of the credibility essential that every citizen awaits the institutions of state.

But why the silence of the victims? It is understood that of the perpetrators, which in turn have been victims of their actions. But why the silence of the victims?

After much thought, we realize that silence is based not only on fear and how fear! There is also a basic aspect of dignity.
One thing is presented to the family after his arrest. It costs the allegation of innocence and to a certain pride at having suffered injustice and suffering for a cause that is considered noble. It is also human and not wanting to appear arrogant humbled. But lift the veil of torture, humiliation, rape physical and psychological, is very difficult to do. Even before their own spouses. And that same silence was understandable deepening suffering damage not shared, confidences drowned, of that we prefer to put on the shelf of nightmares and boot from the archives of history.

After much listening, still difficult to imagine: the shame of sexual assault, improper detachment of shame because of all integrity, repeated physical aggression to boot alleged confessions, the electric current, simultaneous blows to the ears known as "Phone", and the malicious wit humans possess when we ensañanos with a victim or just make a show of our power.

Well, not beyond our amazement of how many people tortured had at that time between 17 and 24 years of age, who literally had their lives cut short. How many families destroyed by their parents receive so changed, with the nerves and fears destroyed almost incomprehensible. And how many blighted lives, because after the imprisonment and torture did not find work or place in society, and for that reason alone, also failed to give their children the education, health and welfare to which they had aspiration and right.

But it is also true, we do all this thirty years later, the victims are not the same and look the other way they are and what could have been. Thirty years
then the institutions and people involved in some way in these events are not the same. Thirty years later we have a very different country, which forces us to acknowledge something he should be recognized as unacceptable. And, therefore, thirty years after they have undergone a process of facing a lot of pain, that justice has excelled in many cases and we look with new eyes the future, you can also expect a greater generosity to receive and integrate the best of our social life
those who have been victims of disqualification, injustice and silence.

We do not want to prolong this presentation. The pages of the report will fully aware of what we try to summarize. And on behalf of all members of this Committee, to all who have worked in this Committee, to all who have generously lent their assistance to accomplish this task-a-heart who want to appreciate this joint effort is a contribution more to the "never again" desired by all, and longed to shake hands with which Chile would like to settle outstanding debt in such a brotherhood among siblings from the same village.

In August 2003 the President of the Republic, Mr. Ricardo Lagos Escobar, unveiled the government's proposal on human rights called "No tomorrow without yesterday." It contained a series of measures to "further progress in the delicate process of healing the wounds caused by the serious human rights violations that occurred between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990." Among such measures was the creation of a "... commission to establish rigorously a list of people who have suffered imprisonment and torture for political reasons. "

This measure was completed on November 11, 2003, the date on which it is published in the Official Journal of Supreme Decree (Interior) N ° 1040, which created the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture "to clarify the truth about the serious situation referred to in the preceding paragraph. The decree provided that, within six months of this date1, the Commission should determine who were the people who suffered imprisonment and torture for political reasons in the period from 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1990, and propose remedies.

The foundations of that Decree stated that "any attempt to solve the problem of human rights in Chile requires to give an overall view of violations of fundamental rights of the human person and recognize victims of such violations "and that" many of these people have so far been recognized as victims of repression, nor have received any compensation from the state "and that" only to the extent that we clarify completely Indeed, recognition of their victims and repair the unjust
harm caused, the country can move forward effectively on the path of reconciliation and reunion "2.

Notes:
1 Expandable to three months to prepare the corresponding report. Then, using the DS (Interior) 889, 2004, that deadline was extended until on 30.11.04
2 See Annex Supreme Decree No. 1040, which creates National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture.

With this chapter, the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture aims to describe a basic framework for better understanding of verified political repression during the military regime, considering that it took place, gained momentum and could be extended due to a number of factors of social, political, institutional, legal and cultural. It is not intended to provide a complete picture and detailed history of the regime installed by the military junta of government since the September 11, 1973. Neither seeks to ascertain the relative weight of the various factors which contributed to the breakdown of democracy in Chile, after a period of intense national and international political polarization
and strong social mobilization, or to decide on the responsibilities of each actor and social policy in the incubation and precipitation of the crisis. The knowledge of the process that led to the September 11, 1973, can not justify the massive violation of human rights post. In accordance with the specific mandate of this Commission, did not seem necessary to refer to the previous period, and repeat the historical frame work of human rights violations between 1973 and 1990, conducted over a decade by the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Specifically, this chapter seeks to explain the context of political repression, with particular reference to
political imprisonment and torture.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Board suspended the individual from the same September 11, 1973. In support of this measure, argued that there a picture of internal disturbance attributed to the existence of rebels or seditious, was declared a state of siege throughout the national territory and the state of emergency in certain provinces and departments. As noted
Decree Law No. 5, published in the Official Gazette on September 22, 1973, the "state of siege decreed by internal disturbance in the circumstances facing the country", should be considered a "'state or time of war '"subject to the rules that the Code of Military Justice and other criminal laws contemplated for such critical situations. This mandatory did nothing to remove from the hands of the ordinary courts for the benefit of military justice in time of war the "knowledge and deciding cases for violations of rules on state
site." States of emergency would be renewed without interruption
for fifteen years in a row, while the state of siege-category to further expand the discretionary power in their task of repression, granting government officials the power to order arbitrary arrests, press censorship and suspending a host of civil liberties, would last until March 1978 and then reinstated twice, both in the 1980s.

is legitimate to ask whether there was in fact the "internal war"
repeatedly alleged by the new authorities and their followers as a justification for its repressive policies. Today there is agreement that the armed forces and police gained control of the country during the day of the coup, without suffering major setbacks anywhere. This is explained by the lack of divisions between the Armed Forces, acting jointly, without experiencing breaks between sectors involved in the overthrow of Salvador Allende and others committed to their defense. Some senior party officials of the respect for constitutional order and the policy regardless of the armed forces and police had been forced to resign in the weeks before the Sept. 11, after being isolated within their own institutions, and weighted in favor of institutional extra output to the political crisis of 1973. Additionally, cases consist of all ranks military victims of political repression perpetrated by their peers.

Among the supporters of the deposed government dominated the confusion and fear.
The little resistance that there was sporadic, isolated, uncoordinated, and ineffective fire capability against a professional army cohesive and, moreover, at war. Armed Forces in raids prior to the coup carried out under the recent gun control law had been aware of the lack of relevant or significant stockpiles held by sectors involved in the Unidad Popular, while evaluating the repressive provisions of the NCOs and troops, testing especially in raids firms controlled by workers.
In any case, according to the confession of officers to implement the military coup, caused surprise found little or no resistance, even in major cities.

recorded testimony by Admiral Sergio Huidobro in his memoirs, naval Decision (1998), clear doubts about the almost immediate control of the country by Forces Armed and Order. To assess in perspective the documentary value of his words, it should be noted that, at the time of the coup, Huidobro was part of the High Command of the Navy.

When the military operation began to act, Concepcion was controlled without firing a shot and the same Talcahuano. Same thing happened to the mining centers in Lota, Coronel and Chuquicamata. There were only isolated outbreaks of resistance in some cities. In most parts of the country, their homes and feathering population was enhanced quickly to normal.

In Santiago, the city control was achieved in a few hours. There were only isolated skirmishes in some campuses and factories nationalized and peripheral populations. Only in the center of Santiago is offered in a close fight fire with snipers on the most prominent buildings such as Torre Entel, which was shot with artillery, the new building of the newspaper "Clarín" and others.

telephone services, water, electricity, gas, operated normally through control of the armed forces applied from the dawn of day 11.

General Augusto Pinochet himself, newly appointed commander of the Army, in the edition of September 18, 1973 the newspaper El Mercurio, said: "The calculations we had about five days of fighting, were reduced to 24 hours instead. It was a surprise for us. "

can not be ignored that the most radical of the right and left boasted since the Sixties, a warlike rhetoric that favored the validation of the use of violence. Major media helped fuel political conflicts, using language and libelous disqualifying discouraging dialogue and agreement between the parties in conflict.
With regard to the left, there were proponents emphasize internal tensions to reach the climax of a final showdown . It was hoped that it would solve, by use of arms, the escalating conflict between the revolutionary forces and sectors identified with the defense of capitalism or against radical and abrupt change from the traditional economic structures. To be sure, these theoretical purposes, which caused alarm among the military and police, never resulted in the formation of armed groups able to form a "popular army" parallel, in terms of trying to finally take political power.
This applies both to the organized vanguard of the People (VOP) as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), two groups that made up the Popular Unity coalition. The VOP, as make the right-wing group Patria y Libertad, resorted to selective political assassination, but never became a very small circle of activists. As for the MIR, since the late sixties began armed actions more visible by news that its impact effective drag between the real population and its military power. For their part, the weapons held by authorities and supporters of Popular Unity, at least the authorities seized by the military regime, which stressed the military strength of the "enemy within" - in no case amounted to equip a group conditions threatening a professional army. However it was
abound the testimonies of prisoners who, from his own apprehension and then during the course of the tortures inflicted by their captors, they were constantly pressed to reveal the alleged cache of weapons. In the case of the military, this assumption was inscribed, according to accounts of people who came to this Commission, as part of the struggle against international communism and the Cold War. To this was added the obvious influence of the Cuban revolution in some sectors of the Left, which has inspired, armed proposed road to socialism.
revolutionary rhetoric of these groups gave credibility to the fears of many Chileans, despite the absence of a movement rural or urban guerrilla in the country, at the time of the coup d'etat.

therefore be difficult to find grounds for the thesis of "civil war", which has appealed strongly when trying to explain and validate, both at the same time and in retrospect, political repression practiced Armed Forces and Police. The National Security Doctrine, central to military ideology adapted to the polarized world of the Cold War, proposed the existence of an internal enemy that sought to subvert the order by any means possible, and the Armed Forces as immune to special interests that national unity cracking social and ideological disagreements.
In defense of that organic unity proper to apply the counterinsurgency methods instilled by military training schools in the United States by generations of American and Chilean officials, whose matching methods pointed to the existence of a common model. According to this ideology, repression was a legitimate response to overt or hidden subversion and was relieved to respect the human rights of people who are subtracted motu proprio of ownership, to join the ranks of the enemy. It was none other than Marxism, broadly understood, so far as to cover at least the next few months in a military coup, anyone suspected to resist the dictatorship, especially by its commitment to the political project of the Unidad Popular. But the brutal repression also found among the police officers determined to remote locations and among conscripts, work only superficially exposed to indoctrination. Some obeyed orders
knowing disregard costs, while others were pleased with the new task. In the barracks were encouraged hostility towards civilians by recruits programmatically hostility intensified over the "communist" virtual enemy of military exercises and combat practices.

In fact, government work, in the words of General Gustavo Leigh,
Commander in Chief of the Air Force and, as such, a member of the military junta, was to extirpate the Marxist cancer that threatened the organic life of the nation, using extreme measures, "until the last consequences" .1 Proclamation No. 30 of September 17, 1973, responsibility of the head of Area Cautín, proves that this spirit of annihilation against the alleged enemy within represented an official policy of the military regime, implemented regardless of
standards in wartime at least according to international treaties signed by previous governments of Chile:

In exercise of the powers vested in me, order: 1. From tomorrow, Tuesday, September 18, 1973, the curfew hours will last from 19.00 hours until 06.00 hours the following day. 2. Population are cautioned that any manifestation of opposition to the action of the armed forces or police, either during a raid or while carrying out work monitoring and control of public policy, in word or deed, should be discarded immediately with the use of service weapons. 3. Any action
resistance from extremist groups, forcing the military to take more drastic penalties, not only for perpetrators but also against those detained under house arrest or surveillance. 4. Armed Forces and the police will be aggressive in maintaining public order in either the comfort of all Chileans.
For every innocent who falls will be executed 10 items Marxist undesirable delay, and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Military Justice in Time of War.

At the time of the coup of September 11, 1973 in force in Chile's 1925 Constitution. The Constitution enshrined the separation of powers, whose purpose was to prevent abuses in the exercise of their functions, through reciprocal control of their actions and subject to common law in force. Upon the overthrow of the elected government in 1970, the Board Military proceeded to establish their own authority and to subordinate the exercise of other branches of government to the needs of the moment. The junta said it assumed the "Supreme Command of the Nation", meaning the concentration
Executive, Legislative and Constituent
committed in principle to guarantee the "full effect to the powers of the judiciary" and to respect the "Constitution and laws of the republic, as the country's current situation allows." The military junta declared vested with the mission to repair the ills attributed to the action of Marxism, syndicated as contrary to national interests, defined the current situation as constituting a state of internal war waged against police officers.

Since its inception, the Board was active with hundreds of legislative decree laws. Many of them came into conflict with the current constitution, eventually producing an implied repeal of the same, raising objections in the Supreme Court. She demanded that the decrees effectively amend laws, and should indicate, expressly. Therefore, by Decree Law No. 788, published in the Official Gazette on December 4, 1974, the junta sought to save the situation before, indicating the existence of decree laws constitutional status, which "have had and have the status of amendments, either expressed or implied, partial or total, the corresponding provision of this Constitution." Thereafter, amendments to the Constitution were explicit in nature, thus avoiding the possibility that the law decrees contrary to the Charter of 1925 be declared unenforceable. The well developed mandatory traffic said the new law, which pointed towards the strengthening of the coercive power of the state apparatus. This not only depended on the concentration of power that motivated the members of the military junta to rate their government
an authoritarian regime, was also outlining a series of measures to create favorable institutional and expedite the discretionary power of the new government authorities. In 1974, when the Commander in Chief of the Army assumed the title of Supreme Head of the Nation, then the most traditional of the President of the Republic, the concentration of power became stronger still, going from one phase to another without independent peer unprecedented in the history of Chile. Now, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte met the Commander in Chief of the Army's monopoly on administrative and governmental functions, while presiding over the work of the Governing Board, namely, the Legislative and Constituent. The forced departure of General Gustavo Leigh Guzman of the Board, in 1978, who disapproved of his claims to speed the transfer of power to civilians, would further consolidate the personal leadership of Pinochet.

Following the military coup through various executive orders, dissolved the National Congress and the Constitutional Court that outlawed political parties that formed the Popular Unity, while the break was decreed all remaining communities ( but in 1977, due to the growing opposition Christian Democratic Party to the military regime would also be prohibited); and election records were destroyed. In line with previous measures to dismantle the institutions and procedures required by a representative democracy, is longer in charge of municipal authorities
force, to appoint mayors called to support the work of the Board, and was declared Interim quality of all public administration officials, except members of the Judiciary and the Comptroller. It was, therefore, with the ability to purge will state services. In the absence of elections and deadlines for the exercise of public functions of old popular representation, the public has lost its de elección de sus dirigentes mediante el sufragio. La Junta Militar también
sometió a control las actividades de las organizaciones sindicales e intervino las universidades públicas y privadas, nombrando a altos oficiales de las tres ramas de las Fuerzas Armadas, en servicio activo o en retiro, como rectores-delegados dotados con amplias atribuciones para expulsar de sus planteles a profesores y estudiantes con simpatías de izquierda, a la vez que se sometían a escrutinio los contenidos de la docencia y la programación de los canales universitarios de televisión. Se instauró una rigurosa censura a la prensa escrita, la radio y la televisión, que puso fin a cualquier medio de comunicación masiva capaz de cuestionar or controlling the actions of the military regime, which were implanted conditions likely to abuse of power, whether in the form of political imprisonment and torture. Simultaneously, the curfew in force for years, took away from public scrutiny the actions of state agents of repression employed, allowed to move freely within the prohibited hours. Exile for political reasons went into action immediately, affecting thousands of people, many of which, before you leave the country suffered political imprisonment and torture.

The regime's propaganda efforts sought to create, with the support of the media supporters amplifying the official version of events, a climate of opinion conducive to the implementation of punitive action. It illustrates the alleged Plan Z, which would have defined generically victims targeted by the left doomed to total conquest of power through force, and that evidence, the military and their civilian collaborators, the claim excuse the repressive measures and acts of
presented as self-defense. The Z Plan out among the alarming findings entered in the white paper on change of government in Chile, a work written to evoke emotional support for the coup and its consequences, illustrated with photos of the "weapons of war heavy and light found by the military and order in the arsenals of the Unidad Popular. This book, whose revelations have never been empirically validated,
had the military coup as the timely and proper reaction to the impending coup of the Unidad Popular.
The "sinister part of that operation, informing the country's population by surprise was the simultaneous destruction throughout the country, senior officials of the Armed Forces and Police, as well as political leaders and union opposition. It sought, with this criminal coup, which was to begin on September 17, paralyzed by terror all resistance to the dictatorship of the Unidad Popular, would be implemented immediately. "It must be stated that the White Paper will serve as incriminating evidence in trials conducted by military courts, which constituted a violation of the prevailing standards for admissibility of evidence. Among the supporters of the coup, nor legitimizing their role must be rejected political violence, accompanied by indulgence of the abuses the rule of law, even within the judiciary.

Faced with the absence of a context of internal war, in the absence of armed struggle did threaten the monopoly of power reserved for the armed forces and police, are not legally justified subordination of law to this situation emergency. Nor was there occupation of territories by the enemy to warrant the use of military tribunals in time of war, enshrined in the Code of Military Justice. This code stipulates that military courts in time of war includes the national territory
declared a state of assembly or site, either by external attack or internal commotion, and foreign territory occupied by the Chilean arms. It is recalled that the military junta declared a state of internal commotion site, which was understood as a state or time of war. So legal declaration of war acted as a legal fiction and political justification for repressive measures not correspond to the reference context , employees and military courts in wartime.

How did the advice in discussion? In practice, contravening its own rules only apply its enforcement procedures, ignoring other legal effects of war, it did not recognize the legitimate use of force by their opponents, nor respected the character and rights prisoners, nor consider any of the principles established in international conventions on war. Note that in international law, as evidence of the unanimous and unconditional rejection of torture, it is banned from the laws, including laws of war, in which case it is permissible to kill
during combat operations, but not torture. Moreover, prosecutors, who competed in criminal matters instruct and substantiate all processes, collection and tabulation of relevant evidence, arresting the accused and producing evidence that would be the case, represented a link in the chain of repressive agents. Indeed, merely to receive and record history contrary to the defendants, omitting any action or proceeding that could benefit them and acquitted, being that they played investigate the truth of the facts and gather background
used to verify. However, the statements of the accused were never investigated, whichever reject the benefit of the official tests. Or, instead of personally question those involved, prosecutors often were content to interrogations by officials from observing the military courts, in areas outside them and extracting confessions under duress that adjusted to the requirements of the torturers. The process analysis reveals that, acting with fairness systematic neglect of due process, and even allowed prosecutors
led to torture as a valid method of interrogation. Same is true for other members of the military courts-is the case for auditors privileged punitive mission thereof.

not recognized the right of self defense. In criminal proceedings the accused enjoy various rights and guarantees. For example, to be informed of specific and clear of the facts against them, be assisted by counsel from the initial stages of the investigation, request to activate it and know its contents, seek dismissal of the case ; remain silent or testify without oath, and not be subjected to torture or to inhuman
cruel, inhuman or degrading (2) . However, the suspects through military tribunals in time of war to 1973, almost never have enjoyed the rights outlined above. In such standard military courts was a violation of these rights and guarantees. It was not known with certainty from the facts alleged. Hardly knew the cause of detention, even in cases where there were actual crimes involved. Sometimes he stopped to belong to an institution or company.
Other only be current or former officer of a particular government department.

In general, the involvement of lawyers in the various activities of the research was restricted to the end of them, they could act was for a short time. The lawyers, who are used to prevent the access to their clients, had to leave by tracking them in various detention centers, then attempt to obtain any document proving his arrest, after which press for being subjected to some form of trial that concluded the stage of "investigation" which usually result in torture. Just as was the situation, call a council of war could be appear as a step forward. He at least admitted the possibility of the defense, although not always immediate, as was common practice by prosecutors to reserve one day a month to the attention of lawyers and did not attend that event on the date provided, which The subjects discussed by them were delayed, as prolonged the captivity of their clients. Moreover, it was not possible to apply measures and decisions. It was not possible to know the proceedings. Arts

2. 183, 184 and 121del Code of Military Justice, in relation to art. 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code, art. 18 of the 1925 Constitution and Art. 105 of Geneva Convention regarding treatment of prisoners of war (Convention III).

addition, the construction of the judgments of military tribunals used to be very poor, a level significantly lower than typical of a judiciary.
lacked a solid body reflection. In many cases they gave
established the facts and crimes without major foundations are briefly indicated the defenses of the accused and is quickly rejected as contrary to previous findings. Usually not done a legal analysis of the behavior set, and these are easily framed in preselected criminal types. He even declared reprehensible conduct that never were legally setting instrumental crimes prosecutors. Often the mere confession was admitted to prove the offenses. And then there was
indiscriminate use of presumptions. There were statements that were content to endorse the conclusions of the prosecutor, who in turn, is limited to accepting the military or police complaint, in other cases not even mentioned the facts which are processed, or just generally were recorded.

To dispel any doubt about the vicious practices of the military tribunals in time of war, the Commission has considered illustrative bring up the contents or nature of some statements made by respondents.
They exemplify how military courts exercise after the September 11, 1973 departed significantly from the law and justice:

A) The rulings of military tribunals in time of war show a special behavior, as noun, significantly restricted the right to defense. Role In the process of Calama No. 114-74, 28 people were tried in Chuquicamata detained without due cause or reason. In fact, the War Council had to absolve them of the charge of having violated Article 4,
letter c) of the State Security Law. However, in phrases makers, the decision dated August 14, 1974 states: "4 .- That is the spirit of the military junta H. who currently heads the country's destiny not to punish people for ideas policies, but by the criminal acts they may have incurred and also his spirit of giving opportunity for citizens to be rehabilitated and become useful to society elements that are part; 5 .-
That, however, H. Martial seems to inconvenience
total and absolute presence and permanence of such individuals in this area, because although it was not possible to configure the crimes charged and the related responsibilities, is no less true that they are negative elements factor are not any guarantee for the security and tranquility that the country needs for national recovery. "As a result of the foregoing, the defendants were expelled from the mineral.

B) In assessing the evidence in conscience was common to use interpretations absolutely
conflict with the law, from which the martial sought to be exempted from minimum standards of logic, reasonableness and justification of decisions. It was not implemented as a method to find the conviction with more effort, but as an admission shows irregular or poorly established or assumed facts to prefer some background on others arbitrarily. No such assessment was delicate, difficult, reasoned that moves the conscience of the sentencing in checking the crime or the person responsible in order to form a conviction.
not ever said that the assessment of the evidence in conscience, and the failure consciousness, are reflections of larger and not merely licensing process. Role In the process of Linares N ° 12-73, where 76 people were tried for different facts, the court-martial expressed the appreciation of the evidence in conscience "is to fail entirely according to personal
convinced." He admits that the court has "more features a jury of a court of law ." He adds concepts such as: "The council of war uses free from all backgrounds, but it looks hindered by legal constraints," so that " has failed to make special considerations on the evidence "

The ruling of the court martial of Linares in the process of Roll No. 21-74, is even more specific. He says: " the power to assess the evidence in conscience give a true repeal of the rules that channel or limit the regulation of evidence, in terms that, in the words of one author, the court may fail entirely according to his personal conviction or , as case law has consistently held national resolve
consciousness means acting with inner knowledge of good and we should do evil to avoid . "

This could be possible that in the process of Role Conception No. 1726-73, to support the Council condemns War stated that "the defendant's confession can also help to establish the existence of crime" and that "it can not deduct the full existence of the offense for the defendant, who claimed to have destroyed the explosives he had in his house " . These decisions departed completely from the evidentiary rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, legal body applicable also in the military judicial system (3)

(3) Article 194, paragraph three, of the Code of Military Justice, respect to Title IV of Part Two of Book II of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

C) In the Courts wartime military was abuse of assumptions, often torn, facts not proven. The fact of being a member, for example, a political party, trade union or other group, just to state responsibility for acts attributed to that group, although there was no precedent to suggest that the accused had participated in the event criminal act. Thus, in the process of Rol N ° 428-73 of Antofagasta, is judged to Socialist Party members
Tocopilla for violations of the Arms Control Act. The court martial sentence on December 12, 1973: " Indeed, in their intellectual qualities of top leaders and party activists Tocopilla socialist, could not ignore the storage of explosives and other war exists in the headquarters of the community and could not ignore the use was intended to give such items as terrorist plans drawn up by the top leaders of his party and
other subjects of the former People's Unit. This is why it weighs on all the serious presumption of liability established in the art. 8, final paragraph (later the penultimate), of the Firearms Control Act, not undermined by the defense or by the declaration made by the defendants. Indeed, this presumption applies when you discover a weapons storage and is presumed to be
be members of an armed group to fight the people listed as owners or authorized to possess weapons, or the inhabitants of the places where the stores are located and who leased or provided the land for the deposit. " . The Commander in Chief of the First Division approves the sentence on January 22, 1974. Thus, all the Socialists of Tocopilla were considered members of a group of armed combat.
Such circumstances occurred before September 11, 1973 . At that time, one of the victims worked as a teacher in Antofagasta, but as he was punished for having been arrested in Tocopilla.

In the process just mentioned, is created a penalty regardless of any statutory provision. The only defendant who is acquitted of the crimes under investigation for his "little or no culture" and "his low IQ," " as a security measure to control his behavior, he was sentenced to three years of monitoring by the Authority , ordering him to legal work for the good of the country and his own family . " This decision of the court martial completely away from right under the pretext of defending the homeland and family.

On the other hand, in the process of Roll N ° 29-74 of Osorno, followed against seven persons, the court martial considers " is well known that the MIR was prone to violence and cause chaos, and that each of its members knew or could not ignore the objective of achieving power through civil war and the crushing of the enemy, therefore, the mere fact of belonging to the MIR, or be supporter of it, indicating a concert to achieve unlawful purposes identified. was enough to belong to the MIR to punish a member or sympathizer, but not credited in criminal conduct.

D) In \u200b\u200bmany cases disproportionate penalties were applied. Thus, the FACH processes showed an unusual severity. In the famous trial of Roll N ° 1 - 73 are judged people for an alleged infiltration into the Air Force in order to destroy it and replace the other to allow the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Failure of the War Council expressed, among other things, that the defendants justified their actions with the "false pretense be brewing a military coup to overthrow the Marxist government."

also occurs earlier in the process of Roll No. 471-74 of Antofagasta, it is considered a second out of the air force, who is said to have belonged to a core of the MIR, have sung a song Marxist, have been indoctrinated to sabotage the aircraft and make a map of the Air Base, which was given to another person hiding. The court martial sentenced him to the single sentence of perpetual military prison, however that such conduct occurred prior to September 11, 1973. The sentence is approved by the Chief of the First Army Division. It must be remembered that the accused was assigned as counsel
a captain of the Chilean Air Force, who argued that the facts did not constitute the crime of treason
have occurred in peacetime, which dismissed his court-martial for believing that such crime can be committed in peacetime as in wartime. It should also be noted that the plane was not found, this, rather than legally deny its existence, as correpondía aggravated the situation of the defendant, as the fugitive militant course, as noted, " could have given to a foreign power with consequent irreparable damage "

E) In close connection with such disproportionate penalties, there were cases of criminalization of behaviors from very elementary and limited. This was in the process of Role N Osorno 54-75 ° initiated against 16 persons, who attributed the clandestine organization of the Socialist Party after the September 11, 1973 and who was punished for the crime of conspiracy set forth in Decree Law No. 77 1973 and other crimes in the Gun Control Act. However, two of the defendants were punished for the crime of espionage under Articles 245, No. 12, and 246 of the Code of Military Justice, because, according to the council of war, "and wrote extracted
military secrets and other data from the Engineer Regiment No. 4 Arauco, for delivery to the enemy and to favor the latter operations. " It has been established that there was an enemy to deliver secrets or operations that may have been aided.

can add other shows on the ease of establishing martial offenses with little reflection. In the process of Roll No. 4-73 of Punta Arenas, is judged Socialist Party activities in advance of the military coup. It says in the statement that this party " was intended to act offensively against opposition groups and the armed forces were estimated not affiliated with the Popular Unity government ." The statement listed after the alleged claims and perverse
Socialist Party (change the constitution to expel members of Congress and the judiciary, civil war cause, encourage indiscipline and disobedience to the members of the Armed Forces).
With these preparations was awarded to the accused crimes of military rebellion Article 265 of the Code of Military Justice and the crimes of Article 4, letters a), b) and d) of the Law on State Security. In this process occurs through the test range exceptional White Paper change of government in Chile.
In addition, public offenses are punished by members of the Armed Forces in time of war, according to article 284 of the Code of Military Justice, a defendant who, while under arrest, "shouted belligerent and rude to a headland custody that does not address him as using that crap uniform. "

F) When referred to the indiscriminate use of confession, touched more extensive material concerning the admissibility of evidence. Our legal system has evolved as to the nature of the evidence, but it has always set the rules of admissibility, so that judges could not and can not accept but those specifically identified media.
is another rule of certainty. Despite that, the review of military tribunals in time of war established in 1973 holds some surprises. As noted, we used the White Paper as a document that is sufficient unto itself, giving full faith to the text. The book of the accuser against the accused brandished without further care. No role in the process of the court martial of Los Angeles, there were 13 trial, he admitted the assessment of all "the evidence "
understood as all those elements meeting of
conviction process, " even if not those covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure ." So, could be considered a report of the Intelligence Service or a statement made by a defendant in a regiment, which was retracted in court. With this background, the court did not practice the measures ordered by law, but simply used against the accused.

A unilateral definition of a nonexistent war and irregular and punitive action-martial should be added to the abdication, by the Supreme Court of its power, established in the State Constitution in force at the time of the coup, to control and supervise military tribunals in time of war. Thus the Supreme Court disclaimed mistakes and abuses committed by military tribunals, not only in performance but also its resolutions. Renouncing their custody of courts-martial, nor objected to the arbitrary extension of their jurisdiction to include acts and behavior prior to the enactment of the state of siege.

This led to dire consequences with regard to respect for human rights, since their exclusion court allowed the most serious violations of individuals and the law. A court exclusion was therefore committed by the highest court that a substance so special and usually as sensitive as the discernment of minors for criminal purposes, was also transferred to military courts in wartime. The collusion of the highest judicial authorities with the military responded, in part, to their common rejection of the government overthrown. The senior judges censured his claim to the establishment of socialism through the use of "loopholes" legal, as well as the deliberate inaction of the Executive to the violation of private property by their supporters, ignoring for political reasons many judgments mandating public
forcibly evict those involved in the "takings" of farms and factories. The fierce defense of judicial power, thwarted by administrative resistance to the execution of its judgments, drastically damaged relations between the executive and judicial powers, whose members were bitterly attacked by the spokespersons of the Popular Unity government, accusing them of acting as guardians of the interests of the privileged classes, in their resistance to the process of changes leading to greater social justice.

It should be noted that the Supreme Court not only gave the land for the discretionary action of the new authorities and their agents. In addition, ignored abuses against people left totally defenseless against those injustices. And this despite the fact that from the beginning, they were strongly denounced by the defense lawyers, who, accepting legal standards for strength in time of war, tried unsuccessfully to respect the international treaties signed by Chile in the matter, with order to enforce the guarantees of humane treatment of prisoners. In fact, the highest court in the country
provided strong support for the military government. Among his ministers, who had joined a political tour in Europe to validate externally the reasons of "military coup." President Supreme Court at the time of the coup was particularly emphatic in their adherence to the new authorities. In the opening speeches of the judicial year, the most solemn annual event of the Executive, insisted on expressing their support for the military government, going so far as to deny validity and authority to allegations of violations of human rights
made by national and international, and dismissing his criticism of the prevailing system of public freedoms in Chile after the coup. When he referred to those arrested under the new regime, presented a sympathetic picture without dark sides, which is not consistent with the thousands of testimonies to the contrary.

The deep political implications of such statements were much more damaging when they were spoken or reproduced by the press in favor of the regime, the only exercise, minimizing or denying their practices against a deliberately uninformed public. You can read the following in the year, corresponding to March 1, 1974 the afternoon La Segunda: "The President [of the Supreme Court, Enrique Urrutia Manzano] that has been imposed speech that many of the detainees, who were under the laws governing the state of siege, have been released. Others are processed in the ordinary or military courts, and with respect those who are detained under the powers of martial law into effect, makes an effort to alleviate the plight of detainees and clarify as soon as their participation in conflict with the law. It is hoped that this effort can be completed as soon as possible to the situation in which families are affected
.

Supreme Court president persisted in supporting the military regime, stating its categorical rejection
who are bent on attacking the new government.

this country, "said Urrutia Manzano from the pages of The Mercury on March 2, 1975 - joined in due course the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Chile, which is not a land of barbarians, as has been suggested on the outside, and by unpatriotic or foreign individuals who obey interested policy, has endeavored to comply strictly such rights, you may only be issued and arrests attributable to legal process or processed under special powers given by the state of referral. As for torture and atrocities
of the same nature, I can say that here there are no walls or curtains of iron, and any assertion to the contrary is due to proselytizing press ideas that could not and will thrive in our country.

¨ * ° ° Buenos Aires Green "¨ * ¨ Decriminalizes Comment

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